Abstract. The multi-leader-follower game can be looked on as a generalization of the Nash equilibrium problem (NEP), which contains several leaders and followers. Recently, the multi-leaderfollower game has been drawing more and more attention, for example, in power markets. On the other hand, in such real-world problems, uncertainty normally exists and sometimes cannot simply be ignored. To handle mathematical programming problems with uncertainty, the robust optimization ( $RO$ ) technique assumes that the uncertain data belong to some sets, and the objective function is minimized with respect to the worst-case scenario. In this paper, we focus on a class of multi-leader single-follower games under uncertainty with some special structure. We particularly assume that the follower's problem only contains equality constraints. By means of the $RO$ technique, we first formulate the game as the robust Nash equilibrium problem, and then the generalized variational inequality (GVI) problem. We then establish some results on the existence and uniqueness of a robust $L/F$ Nash equilibrium. We also apply the forward-backward splitting method to solve the GVI formulation of the problem and present some numerical examples to illustrate the behavior of robust $L/F$ Nash equilibria.
1. Introduction. As a solid mathematical methodology to deal with many social problems, such as economics, management and political science, game theory studies the strategic solutions, where an individual makes a choice by taking into account the others' choices. Game theory was developed widely in 1950 as John Nash introduced the well-known concept of Nash equilibrium in non-cooperative games [27, 28] , which means no player can obtain any more benefit by changing his/her current strategy unilaterally (other players keep their current strategies). Since then, the Nash equilibrium problem (NEP), or the Nash game, has received a lot of academic attention from more and more researchers. It has also been playing an important role in many apphcation areas of economics, engineering and so on [4, 35] .
The multi-leader-follower game can be looked on as a generalization of the Nash equilibrium problem, which arises in various real-world conflict situations such as the oligopolistic competition in a deregulated electricity market. It may further be divided into that which contains only one follower, called the multi-leader single-follower game and that which contains multiple followers, called the multi-leader multi-follower game. In the multi-leader-follower game, several distinctive players called the leaders solve their own optimization problems in the upper-level where the leaders compete in a Nash game. At the same time, given the leaders' strategies, the remaining players called the followers also solve their own optimization problems in the lower-level where the followers also compete in a Nash game which is parameterized by the strat-$*This$ work was supported in part by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research from Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. egy tuple of the leaders. In particular, the leaders can anticipate the responses of the followers, and then use this ability to select their own optimal strategies. On the other hand, each follower selects his $/her$ optimal strategy responding to the strategies of the leaders and the other followers. When no player can improve his/her status by changing his $/her$ strategy unilaterally, we call the current set of leaders' and followers' strategies a leader-follower Nash equilibrium, or simply a $L/F$ Nash equilibrium.
The multi-leader-follower game has been studied by some researchers and used to model several problems in applications.
$A$ particular type of multi-leader multifollower games was first studied by Sherali [34] , where he established an existence result about the equilibrium by assuming that each leader can exactly anticipate the aggregate follower reaction curve. Sherali [34] also ensured the uniqueness of equilibrium for a special case where all leader share an identical cost function. Su [37] considered a forward market equilibrium model, where he extended the existence result of Sherali [34] under some weaker assumptions. Pang and Fukushima [30] introduced a class of remedial models for the multi-leader-follower game that can be formulated as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) with convexified strategy sets. Moreover, they also proposed some oligopolistic competition models in electricity power markets that lead to multi-leader-follower games. Based on the strong stationarity conditions of each leader in a multi-leader-follower game, Leyffer and Munson [25] derived a family of NCP, NLP, and MPEC formulations of the multi-leader-follower games. They also reformulated the game as a square nonlinear complementarity problem by imposing an additional restriction. By considering the equivalent implicit program formulation, Hu and Ralph [22] established an existence result about the equilibrium of a multi-leader multi-follower game which arose from a restructured electricity market model.
In the above mentioned two equilibrium concepts, Nash equilibrium and $L/F$ Nash equilibrium, each player is assumed to have complete information about the game. This means, in a NEP, each player can observe his/her opponents' strategies and choose his/her own strategy exactly, while in a multi-leader-follower game, each leader can anticipate each follower's response to the leaders' strategies exactly. However, in many real-world problems, such strong assumptions are not always satisfied. Another kind of games with uncertain data and the corresponding concept of equilibria need to be considered.
There have been some important work about the games with uncertain data. Under the assumption on probability distributions called Bayesian hypothesis, Harsanyi [17, 18, 19] considered a game with incomplete information, where the players have no complete information about some important parameters of the game. Further assuming all players shared some common knowledge about those probability distributions, the game was finally reformulated as a game with complete information essentially, called the Bayes-equivalent of the original game. DeMiguel and Xu [10] considered a stochastic multi-leader multi-follower game applied in a telecommunication industry and established the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. Shanbhag, Infanger and Glynn [33] considered a class of stochastic multi-leader multi-follower game and established the existence of local equilibrium by a related simultaneous stochastic Nash game.
Besides the probability distribution models, the distribution-free models based on the worst case scenario have received attention in recent years [1, 20, 29] . In the latter models, each player makes a decision according to the concept of robust optimization [5, 6, 7, 11] . Basically, in robust optimization ( $RO$ ), uncertain data are assumed to belong to some set called an uncertainty set, and then a solution is sought by taking int $0$ account the worst case in terms of the objective function value and/or the constraint violation. In a NEP containing some uncertain parameters, we may also define an equilibrium called robust Nash equilibrium. Namely, if each player has chosen a strategy pessimistically and no player can obtain more benefit by changing his $/her$ own current strategy unilaterally (i.e., the other players hold their current strategies), then the tuple of the current strategies of all players is defined as a robust Nash equilibrium, and the problem of finding a robust Nash equihbrium is called a robust Nash equilibrium problem. Such an equilibrium problem was studied by Hayashi, Yamashita and Fukushima [20] , where the authors considered the bimatrix game with uncertain data and proposed a new concept of equilibrium called robust Nash equilibrium. Under some assumptions on the uncertainty sets, they presented some existence results about robust Nash equilibria. Furthermore, the authors showed that such a robust Nash equilibrium problem can be reformulated as a second-order cone complementarity problem (SOCCP) by converting each player's problem into a second-order cone program (SOCP) . Aghassi and Bertsimas [1] considered a robust Nash equilibrium in an $N$ -person NEP with bounded polyhedral uncertainty sets, where each player solves a linear programming problem. They also proposed a method of computing robust Nash equilibria. Note that both of these models [1, 20] particularly deal with linear objective functions in players' optimization problems.
More recently, Nishimura, Hayashi and Fukushima [29] considered a more general NEP with uncertain data, where each player solves an optimization problem with a nonlinear objective function. Under some mild assumptions on the uncertainty sets, the authors presented some results about the existence and uniqueness of the robust Nash equilibrium. They also proposed to compute a robust Nash equilibrium by reformulating the problem as an SOCCP.
In this paper, inspired by the previous work on the robust Nash equilibrium problem, we extend the idea of robust optimization for the NEP to the multi-leader single-follower game. 1 We propose a new concept of equilibrium for the multi-leader single-follower gme with uncertain data, called robust $L/F$ Nash equilibrium. In particular, we show some results about the existence and uniqueness of the robust $L/F$ Nash equilibrium. We also consider the computation of the equilibrium by reformulating the problem as a GVI problem. It may be mentioned here that the idea of this paper also comes from Hu and Fukushima [21] , where the authors considered a class of multi-leader single-follower games with complete information and showed some existence and uniqueness results for the $L/F$ Nash equilibrium by way of the variational inequality (VI) formulation.
$A$ remarkable feature of the multi-leader single-follower game studied in this paper is that the leaders anticipate the follower's response under their respective uncertain circumstances, and hence the follower's responses estimated by the leaders are generally different from each other.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe the robust multi-leader single-follower game and define the corresponding robust $L/F$ Nash equilibrium. In Section 3, we show sufficient conditions to guarantee the existence of a robust $L/F$ Nash equilibrium by reformulating it as a robust Nash equilibrium problem. In Section 4, we consider a particular class of robust multi-leader singlefollower games with uncertain data, and discuss the uniqueness of the robust Nash $\overline{1We}$ will focus on the multi-leader singlefollower game. This is, however, for simplicity of presentation. In fact, the obtained results can naturally be extended to some multi-leader multi- Then, the $NEP$ comprised of the players' problems (2.1) has at least one Nash equilibrium.
In the NEP with complete information, all players are in the equal position. Nash equilibrium is well-defined when all players seek their own optimal strategies simultaneously by observing and estimating the opponents' strategies, as well as the values of their own objective functions, exactly. However, in many real-world $mo$ dels, such information may contain some uncertain parameters, because of observation errors and/or estimation errors.
To deal with some uncertainty in the NEP, Nishimura, Hayashi and Fukushima [29] 2.2. Multi-Leader Single-Follower Games with Uncertainty. In this subsection, we describe a multi-leader single-follower game with uncertainty, and then define the corresponding robust $L/F$ Nash equihbrium based on the above discussions about the robust Nash equilibrium.
First, we introduce the multi-leader single-follower game. Let $X^{\nu}\subseteq \mathbb{R}^{n_{\nu}}$ denote the strategy set of leader $v,$ $\nu=1,$ $\cdots,$ $N$ . We assume that the strategy set of each leader is independent of the other rival leaders. We also denote each leader's objective function by $\theta_{\nu}(x^{\nu}, x^{-\nu}, y),$ $\nu=1,$ $\cdots,$ $N$ , which is dependent of his $/her$ own strategy $x^{\nu}$ and all the other rival leaders' strategies $x^{-\nu}\in X^{-\nu}$ $:= \prod_{\nu=1,\nu\neq\nu}^{N}X^{\nu'}$ , as well ae the follower's strategy denoted by $y.$ Let $\gamma(x, y)$ and $K(x)$ denote, respectively, the follower's objective function and strategy set that depend on the leaders' strategies $x=(x^{\nu})_{\nu=1}^{N}$ . For given strategies $x$ of the leaders, the follower chooses his $/her$ strategy by solving the following optimization problem for variable $y$ :
For the multi-leader single-follower game described above, we can define an equihbrium called $L/F$ Nash equilibrium [21] In the follower's problem (2.6) anticipated by leader $v$ , we assume that for any fixed $x\in X$ and $v^{\nu}\in V^{\nu},$ $\gamma_{\nu}(x, \cdot, v^{\nu})$ is a strictly convex function and $K(x)$ is a nonempty, closed, convex set. That is, problem (2.6) is a strictly convex optimization problem parameterized by $x$ and $v^{\nu}$ . We denote its unique optimal solution by $y^{\nu}(x, v^{\nu})$ , which we assume to exist. Therefore, the above multi-leader single-follower game with uncertainty can be reformulated as a robust The VI and GVI problems have wide applications in various areas, such as transportation systems, mechanics, and economics [15, 26] .
Recall that a vector-valued function $F$ : $\mathbb{R}^{n}arrow \mathbb{R}^{n}$ is said to be monotone (strictly monotone) on a nonempty convex set $S\subseteq \mathbb{R}^{n}$ if $(F(x)-F(y))^{T}(x-y)\geq(>)0$ for all $x,$ $y\in S$ $(for all x, y\in S such that x\neq y)$ . It is well known that if $F$ is a strictly monotone function, VI (2.11) has at most one solution [13] . The GVI problem has a similar property. To see this, we first introduce the monotonicity of a set-valued mapping. DEFINITION 2.4. [39] Let $S\subseteq \mathbb{R}^{n}$ be a nonempty convex set. is not properly contained in the graph of any other monotone mapping on $\mathbb{R}^{n}.$ PROPOSITION 2.5. [14] Suppose that the set-valued mapping $\mathcal{F}$ : $\mathbb{R}^{n}arrow \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{R}^{n})$ is strictly monotone on S. Then the $GVI(2.10)$ has at most one solution.
Maximal monotone mappings have been studied extensively, e.g., see [31] . Proof. For each leader $v$ , since Assumption 3.1 holds, the function $\tilde{\Theta}_{\nu}$ is continuous and finite at any $x\in X$ and it is als $0$ convex with respect to $x^{\nu}$ on $X^{\nu}$ from Proposition 3.2. Therefore, from Lemma 2.1, the NEP comprised of problems (2.9) has at least one Nash equilibrium. That is to say, the Nash equilibrium problem with uncertainty comprised of problems (2.7) has at least one robust Nash equilibrium. This also means, by Definition 2.2, the multi-leader single-follower game with uncertainty comprised of problems (2.5) and (2.6) has at least one robust $L/F$ Nash In this game, the objective functions of $N$ leaders and the follower contain some related terms. In particular, the last term of each leader's objective function appears in the follower's objective function in the negated form. Therefore, the game partly contains a kind of zero-sum structure between each leader and the follower. An apphcation of such special multi-leader single-follower games with complete information has been presented with some illustrative numerical examples in [21] . Here We assume that although the follower can respond to all leaders' strategies exactly, yet each leader $\nu$ cannot exactly know the follower's problem, but can only anticipate it as follows: minimizey $\gamma^{\nu}(x, y, v^{\nu})$ $:= \frac{1}{2}y^{T}By+(c+v^{\nu})^{T}y-\sum_{\nu=1}^{N}\varphi_{\nu}(x^{\nu}, y)$ subject to $y\in \mathcal{Y}.$ Here, the uncertain parameter $v^{\nu}$ belongs to some fixed uncertainty set $V^{\nu}\subseteq \mathbb{R}^{m}.$
In the remainder of the paper, for simplicity, we will mainly consider the following game with two leaders, labelled I and II. The results presented below can be extended to the case of more than two leaders in a straightforward manner. 2 In this game, leader $\nu$ solves the following problem: (4.1) and (4.2) has at least one robust $L/F$ Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We will show that the conditions in Assumption 3.1 hold. Since conditions It can be shown [21, where $T(x)$ is given by (4.7) . Note that $\mathcal{A}$ is set-valued, while $\mathcal{B}$ is vector-valued. 6. Conclusion. In this paper, we have considered a class of multi-leader singlefollower games with uncertainty. We have defined a new concept for the multi-leader single-follower game with uncertainty, called robust $L/F$ Nash equilibrium. We have discussed the existence and the uniqueness of a robust $L/F$ Nash equilibrium by reformulating the game as a NEP with uncertainty and then a GVI problem. By numerical experiments including those for the multi-follower case, we have observed the influence of uncertainty on the follower's responses estimated by the leaders.
